LSE creators

Number of items: 21.
None
  • Gottlieb, Daniel, Smetters, Kent (2021). Data and Code for: Lapse-Based Insurance. [Dataset]. OpenICPSR. https://doi.org/10.3886/e124701v1
  • Gottlieb, Daniel, Mitchell, Olivia S (2019). Narrow framing and long-term care insurance. Journal of Risk and Insurance, 1-33. https://doi.org/10.1111/jori.12290
  • Gottlieb, Daniel (2014). Imperfect memory and choice under risk. Games and Economic Behavior, 85, 127 - 158. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.11.013
  • Gottlieb, Daniel, Moreira, Humberto (2012). Should educational policies be regressive? Journal of Public Economic Theory, 14(4), 601 - 623. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9779.2012.01554.x
  • Azevedo, Eduardo M., Gottlieb, Daniel (2012). Risk-neutral firms can extract unbounded profits from consumers with prospect theory preferences. Journal of Economic Theory, 147(3), 1291 - 1299. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2012.01.002
    • Public
  • Chaigneau, Pierre, Edmans, Alex, Gottlieb, Daniel (2025). A theory of fair CEO pay. American Economic Review: Insights, 7(3), 306 – 324. https://doi.org/10.1257/aeri.20240332 picture_as_pdf
  • Dillenberger, David, Gottlieb, Daniel, Ortoleva, Pietro (2025). Stochastic impatience and the separation of time and risk preferences. Theoretical Economics, 20(3), 1043 - 1080. https://doi.org/10.3982/te5771 picture_as_pdf
  • Citanna, Alex, Gottlieb, Daniel, Siconolfi, Paolo, Zhang, Xingtan (2023). Corrigendum long-term contracting with time-inconsistent agents (Econometrica, 89, 2, (793–824), 10.3982/ECTA17126). Econometrica, 91(3), 25 - 30. https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA21301 picture_as_pdf
  • Gottlieb, Daniel, Moreira, Humberto (2022). Simple contracts with adverse selection and moral hazard. Theoretical Economics, 17(3), 1357 – 1401. https://doi.org/10.3982/TE2992 picture_as_pdf
  • Chaigneau, Pierre, Edmans, Alex, Gottlieb, Daniel (2022). How should performance signals affect contracts? Review of Financial Studies, 35(1), 168 - 206. https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhab026 picture_as_pdf
  • Gottlieb, Daniel, Smetters, Kent (2021). Lapse-based insurance. American Economic Review, 111(8), 2377 - 2416. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20160868 picture_as_pdf
  • Gottlieb, Daniel, Zhang, Xingtan (2021). Long-term contracting with time-inconsistent agents. Econometrica, 89(2), 793 - 824. https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA17126 picture_as_pdf
  • DeJarnette, Patrick, Dillenberger, David, Gottlieb, Daniel, Ortoleva, Pietro (2020). Time lotteries and stochastic impatience. Econometrica, 88(2), 619 - 656. https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA16427 picture_as_pdf
  • Bursztyn, Leonardo, Fiorin, Stefano, Gottlieb, Daniel, Kanz, Martin (2019). Moral incentives in credit card debt repayment: evidence from a field experiment. Journal of Political Economy, 127(4), 1641 - 1683. https://doi.org/10.1086/701605 picture_as_pdf
  • Azevedo, Eduardo M., Gottlieb, Daniel (2019). An example of non-existence of Riley equilibrium in markets with adverse selection. Games and Economic Behavior, 116, 152 - 157. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2019.04.007 picture_as_pdf
  • Chaigneau, Pierre, Edmans, Alex, Gottlieb, Daniel (2019). The informativeness principle without the first-order approach. Games and Economic Behavior, 113, 743 - 755. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2018.08.006 picture_as_pdf
  • Chaigneau, Pierre, Edmans, Alex, Gottlieb, Daniel (2018). Does improved information improve incentives? Journal of Financial Economics, 130(2), 291 - 307. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2018.05.002 picture_as_pdf
  • Gottlieb, Daniel, Zhang, Xingtan (2018). Long-term contracting with time-inconsistent agents. SSRN. picture_as_pdf
  • Azevedo, Eduardo M., Gottlieb, Daniel (2017). Perfect competition in markets with adverse selection. Econometrica, 85(1), 67 - 105. https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA13434 picture_as_pdf
  • Gomes, Renato, Gottlieb, Daniel, Maestri, Lucas (2016). Experimentation and project selection: screening and learning. Games and Economic Behavior, 96, 145 - 169. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2016.02.001 picture_as_pdf
  • Chaigneau, Pierre, Edmans, Alex, Gottlieb, Daniel (2014). The value of informativeness for contracting. (Financial Markets Group Discussion Papers 737). Financial Markets Group, The London School of Economics and Political Science. picture_as_pdf