JEL classification

Journal of Economic Literature Classification (10696) C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods (1374) C9 - Design of Experiments (133) C92 - Laboratory, Group Behavior (20)
Number of items at this level: 20.
Centre for Economic Performance
  • Clark, Andrew E., Masclet, David, Villeval, Marie-Claire (2008). Effort and comparison income: experimental and survey evidence. (CEP Discussion Paper 886). London School of Economics and Political Science. Centre for Economic Performance.
    • Centre for Philosophy of Natural and Social Sciences (CPNSS)
  • Mäs, Michael, Nax, Heinrich H. (2016). A behavioral study of “noise” in coordination games. Journal of Economic Theory, 162, 195-208. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2015.12.010
  • Nax, Heinrich H., Balietti, Stefano, Murphy, Ryan O., Helbing, Dirk (2015). Meritocratic matching can dissolve the efficiency-equality tradeoff: the case of voluntary contributions. Eidgenössische Technische Hochschule Zürich.
    • Economics
  • Bandiera, Oriana, Barankay, Iwan, Rasul, Imran (2005). Cooperation in collective action. Economics of Transition, 13(3), 473-498. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0351.2005.00228.x
  • Fischer, Gregory (2011). Contract structure, risk sharing and investment choice. (Economic Organisation and Public Policy Discussion Papers EOPP/2011/23). Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines.
  • Fischer, Gregory (2013). Contract structure, risk sharing and investment choice. Econometrica, 81(3), 883-939. https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA9100
  • Kirchsteiger, Georg, Prat, Andrea (2001). Inefficient equilibria in lobbying. Journal of Public Economics, 82(3), 349-375. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0047-2727(00)00134-1
  • Weizsacker, Georg (2008). Do we follow others when we should? A simple test of rational expectations. ESRC Centre for Economic Learning and Social Evolution, University College London.
  • İriş, D., Lee, J., Tavoni, A. (2019). Delegation and public pressure in a threshold public goods game. Environmental and Resource Economics, 74(3), 1331 - 1353. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-019-00371-6 picture_as_pdf
    • Geography and Environment
  • Kim, Hyoyoung, Iris, Doruk, Lee, Jinkwon, Tavoni, Alessandro (2025). Representation, peer pressure and punishment in a public goods game. Environmental and Resource Economics, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-025-00970-6
  • Shreedhar, Ganga, Tavoni, Alessandro, Marchiori, Carmen (2020). Monitoring and punishment networks in an experimental common pool resource dilemma. Environment and Development Economics, 25(1), 66 - 94. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1355770X19000457
  • İriş, D., Lee, J., Tavoni, A. (2019). Delegation and public pressure in a threshold public goods game. Environmental and Resource Economics, 74(3), 1331 - 1353. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-019-00371-6 picture_as_pdf
    • Grantham Research Institute
  • Bosetti, Valentina, Heugues, Melanie, Tavoni, Alessandro (2017). Luring others into climate action: coalition formation games with threshold and spillover effects. Oxford Economic Papers, 69(2), 410-431. https://doi.org/10.1093/oep/gpx017
  • Isaksen, Elisabeth Thuestad, Brekke, Kjell Arne, Richter, Andries (2019). Positive framing does not solve the tragedy of the commons. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 95, 45-56. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2018.11.005 picture_as_pdf
  • Shreedhar, Ganga, Tavoni, Alessandro, Marchiori, Carmen (2020). Monitoring and punishment networks in an experimental common pool resource dilemma. Environment and Development Economics, 25(1), 66 - 94. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1355770X19000457
  • İriş, D., Lee, J., Tavoni, A. (2019). Delegation and public pressure in a threshold public goods game. Environmental and Resource Economics, 74(3), 1331 - 1353. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-019-00371-6 picture_as_pdf
    • Management
  • Akinsete, Ebun, Velias, Alina, Papadaki, Lydia, Chatzilazarou, Lazaros-Antonios, Koundouri, Phoebe (2025). Blending experimental economics and living laboratories in water resource management. Annual Review of Resource Economics, 17(1), 149 - 165. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-resource-013024-033007 picture_as_pdf
    • Psychological and Behavioural Science
  • Akinsete, Ebun, Velias, Alina, Papadaki, Lydia, Chatzilazarou, Lazaros-Antonios, Koundouri, Phoebe (2025). Blending experimental economics and living laboratories in water resource management. Annual Review of Resource Economics, 17(1), 149 - 165. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-resource-013024-033007 picture_as_pdf
  • Brañas-Garza, Pablo, Galizzi, Matteo M., Nieboer, Jeroen (2018). Experimental and self-reported measures of risk taking and digit ratio (2D:4D): evidence from a large, systematic study. International Economic Review, 59(3), 1131 - 1157. https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12299
  • Shreedhar, Ganga, Tavoni, Alessandro, Marchiori, Carmen (2018). Monitoring and punishment networks in a common-pool resource dilemma: experimental evidence. (Working Paper 327). Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment, The Centre for Climate Change Economics and Policy.
  • Shreedhar, Ganga, Tavoni, Alessandro, Marchiori, Carmen (2020). Monitoring and punishment networks in an experimental common pool resource dilemma. Environment and Development Economics, 25(1), 66 - 94. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1355770X19000457
    • STICERD
  • Bandiera, Oriana, Barankay, Iwan, Rasul, Imran (2005). Cooperation in collective action. Economics of Transition, 13(3), 473-498. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0351.2005.00228.x
  • Fischer, Gregory (2011). Contract structure, risk sharing and investment choice. (Economic Organisation and Public Policy Discussion Papers EOPP/2011/23). Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines.
  • Fischer, Gregory (2013). Contract structure, risk sharing and investment choice. Econometrica, 81(3), 883-939. https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA9100
  • Kirchsteiger, Georg, Prat, Andrea (2001). Inefficient equilibria in lobbying. Journal of Public Economics, 82(3), 349-375. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0047-2727(00)00134-1
    • Social Policy
  • Bougheas, Spiro, Nieboer, Jeroen, Sefton, Martin (2015). Risk taking and information aggregation in groups. Journal of Economic Psychology, 51, 34-47. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.joep.2015.08.001
  • Brañas-Garza, Pablo, Galizzi, Matteo M., Nieboer, Jeroen (2014). Digit ratio and risk taking: evidence from a large, multi-ethnic sample. (Working Papers 14-23). Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
  • Brañas-Garza, Pablo, Galizzi, Matteo M., Nieboer, Jeroen (2018). Experimental and self-reported measures of risk taking and digit ratio (2D:4D): evidence from a large, systematic study. International Economic Review, 59(3), 1131 - 1157. https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12299
  • Galizzi, Matteo M., Navarro-Martínez, Daniel (2015). On the external validity of social preferences games: a systematic lab-field study. (Barcelona GSE Working Paper 802). Barcelona GSE.
  • Galizzi, Matteo M., Nieboer, Jeroen (2015). Digit ratio (2D:4D) and altruism: evidence from a large, multi-ethnic sample. Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience, 9, p. 41. https://doi.org/10.3389/fnbeh.2015.00041