JEL classification

Journal of Economic Literature Classification (10696) D - Microeconomics (2307) D4 - Market Structure and Pricing (136) D44 - Auctions (51)
Number of items at this level: 51.
A
  • Abbink, Klaus, Irlenbusch, Bernd, Pezanis-Christou, Paul, Rockenbach, Bettina, Sadrieh, Abdolkarim, Selten, Reinhard (2005). An experimental test of design alternatives for the British 3G/UMTS auction. European Economic Review, 49(2), 505-530. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0014-2921(03)00044-8
  • Ashkenazi-Golan, Galit, Tsodikovich, Yevgeny, Viossat, Yannick (2023). I want to tell you? Maximizing revenue in first-price two-stage auctions. Economic Theory, 76(4), 1329 - 1362. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-023-01498-w picture_as_pdf
  • Asker, John, Grosskopf, Brit, McKinney, C. Nicholas, Niederle, Muriel, Roth, Alvin E., Weizsacker, Georg (2004). Teaching auction strategy using experiments administered via the internet. Journal of Economic Education, 35(4), 330-342.
  • Axelson, Ulf, Makarov, Igor (2016). Informational black holes in financial markets. (Financial Markets Group Discussion Papers 754). Financial Markets Group, The London School of Economics and Political Science. picture_as_pdf
  • Axelson, Ulf, Makarov, Igor (2026). Sequential credit markets. Journal of Financial Economics, 176, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2025.104216 picture_as_pdf
    • B
  • Baldwin, Elizabeth, Klemperer, Paul (2016). Understanding preferences: "demand types", and the existence of equilibrium with indivisibilities. London School of Economics and Political Science.
  • Belev, Sergey G., Veterinarov, Victor V., Matveev, Evgenii O. (2023). Переход к электронным процедурам в государственных закупках в условиях фаворитизма. Voprosy Ekonomiki, 2023(9), 47 - 64. https://doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2023-9-47-64
  • Bergemann, Dirk, Pesendorfer, Martin (2007). Information structures in optimal auctions. Journal of Economic Theory, 137(1), 580-609. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2007.02.001
  • Bergemann, Dirk, Pesendorfer, Martin (2001). Information structures in optimal auctions. Centre for Economic Policy Research (Great Britain).
  • Boerner, Lars, van Bochove, Christiaan, Quint, Daniel (2012-11-22) Anglo-Dutch premium auctions in eighteenth-century Amsterdam [Paper]. Modern and Comparative seminar, London, United Kingdom, GBR.
  • Borgers, Tilman, Cox, Ingemar, Pesendorfer, Martin, Petricek, Vaclav (2013). Equilibrium bids in sponsored search auctions: theory and evidence. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 5(4), 163-187. https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.5.4.163
  • Brañas-Garza, Pablo, Galizzi, Matteo M., Nieboer, Jeroen (2014). Digit ratio and risk taking: evidence from a large, multi-ethnic sample. (Working Papers 14-23). Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
  • Brañas-Garza, Pablo, Galizzi, Matteo M., Nieboer, Jeroen (2018). Experimental and self-reported measures of risk taking and digit ratio (2D:4D): evidence from a large, systematic study. International Economic Review, 59(3), 1131 - 1157. https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12299
    • C
  • Calel, Raphael (2010). Auctioning conservation contracts in the presence of externalities. (Centre for Climate Change Economics and Policy and Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment 22). Centre for Climate Change Economics and Policy and Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment.
  • Cantillon, Estelle, Pesendorfer, Martin (2007). Combination bidding in multi-unit auctions. Centre for Economic Policy Research (Great Britain).
  • Cantillon, Estelle, Pesendorfer, Martin (2013). Combination bidding in multi-unit auctions. London School of Economics and Political Science.
  • Chen, Zhuoqiong (Charlie), Ong, David, Segev, Ella (2017). Heterogeneous risk/loss aversion in complete information all-pay auctions. European Economic Review, 95, 23-37. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2017.03.002
  • Chernov, Mikhail, Gorbenko, Alexander S., Makarov, Igor (2013). CDS auctions. Review of Financial Studies, 26(3), 768-805. https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhs124
  • Cornelli, Francesca, Felli, Leonardo (2010). How to sell a (bankrupt) company? Centre for Economic Policy Research (Great Britain).
  • Cornelli, Francesca, Felli, Leonardo (1998). Revenue efficiency and change of control: the case of bankruptcy. (CEPR Discussion Paper 2030). Centre for Economic Policy Research (Great Britain).
  • Koutroumpis, Pantelis, Cave, Martin (2018). Auction design and auction outcomes. Journal of Regulatory Economics, 53(3), 275-297. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11149-018-9358-x
    • E
  • Eeckhout, Jan, Kircher, Philipp (2010). Sorting versus screening: search frictions and competing mechanisms. Journal of Economic Theory, 145(4), 1354-1385. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2010.01.005
    • F
  • Friederich, Sylvain, Payne, Richard (2002). Dealer liquidity in an auction market: evidence fom the London Stock Exchange. (Financial Markets Group Discussion Papers 427). Financial Markets Group, The London School of Economics and Political Science.
    • G
  • Galizzi, Matteo M., Nieboer, Jeroen (2015). Digit ratio (2D:4D) and altruism: evidence from a large, multi-ethnic sample. Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience, 9, p. 41. https://doi.org/10.3389/fnbeh.2015.00041
  • Gentry, Matthew, Komarova, Tatiana, Schiraldi, Pasquale (2023). Preferences and performance in simultaneous first-price auctions: a structural analysis. Review of Economic Studies, 90(2), 852 – 878. https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdac030 picture_as_pdf
    • J
  • Jofre-Bonet, Mireia, Pesendorfer, Martin (2000). Bidding behavior in a repeated procurement auction: a summary. European Economic Review, 44(4-6), 1006-1020. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0014-2921(00)00044-1
  • Jofre-Bonet, Mireia, Pesendorfer, Martin (2001). Estimation of a dynamic auction game. National Bureau of Economic Research.
  • Jofre-Bonet, Mireia, Pesendorfer, Martin (2014). Optimal sequential auctions. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 33, 61-71. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2014.02.002
    • K
  • Komarova, Tatiana (2013). A new approach to identifying generalized competing risks models with application to second-price auctions. Quantitative Economics, 4(2), 269-328. https://doi.org/10.3982/QE111
    • L
  • Laohakunakorn, Krittanai, Levy, Gilat, Razin, Ronny (2019). Private and common value auctions with ambiguity over correlation. Journal of Economic Theory, 184, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2019.08.002 picture_as_pdf
    • M
  • Martin, Julien, Pesendorfer, Martin, Shannon, Jack (2025). Underbidding for oil and gas tracts. American Economic Review, 115(8), 2755 - 2780. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20231356 picture_as_pdf
  • Myers, Geoffrey (2023). Afterword: reflections for future auctions. In Spectrum Auctions: Designing markets to benefit the public, industry and the economy (pp. 215 - 220). LSE Press. https://doi.org/10.31389/lsepress.spa.l picture_as_pdf
  • Myers, Geoffrey (2023). Applying expertise in decision-making processes. In Spectrum Auctions: Designing markets to benefit the public, industry and the economy (pp. 69 - 92). LSE Press. https://doi.org/10.31389/lsepress.spa.e picture_as_pdf
  • Myers, Geoffrey (2023). Auction bidding and outcomes. In Spectrum Auctions: Designing markets to benefit the public, industry and the economy (pp. 197 - 213). LSE Press. https://doi.org/10.31389/lsepress.spa.k picture_as_pdf
  • Myers, Geoffrey (2023). Auction design objectives and baseline decisions. In Spectrum Auctions: Designing markets to benefit the public, industry and the economy (pp. 115 - 136). LSE Press. https://doi.org/10.31389/lsepress.spa.g picture_as_pdf
  • Myers, Geoffrey (2023). Choosing an auction format. In Spectrum Auctions: Designing markets to benefit the public, industry and the economy (pp. 137 - 161). LSE Press. https://doi.org/10.31389/lsepress.spa.h picture_as_pdf
  • Myers, Geoffrey (2023). Harnessing auctions for better-informed public policy decisions. In Spectrum Auctions: Designing markets to benefit the public, industry and the economy (pp. 185 - 195). LSE Press. https://doi.org/10.31389/lsepress.spa.j picture_as_pdf
  • Myers, Geoffrey (2023). Introducing spectrum auctions. In Spectrum Auctions: Designing markets to benefit the public, industry and the economy (pp. 3 - 11). LSE Press. https://doi.org/10.31389/lsepress.spa.a picture_as_pdf
  • Myers, Geoffrey (2023). Laying foundations before the auction. In Spectrum Auctions: Designing markets to benefit the public, industry and the economy (pp. 95 - 113). LSE Press. https://doi.org/10.31389/lsepress.spa.f picture_as_pdf
  • Myers, Geoffrey (2023). Market design, economic efficiency, and game theory for spectrum auctions. In Spectrum Auctions: Designing markets to benefit the public, industry and the economy (pp. 35 - 52). LSE Press. https://doi.org/10.31389/lsepress.spa.c picture_as_pdf
  • Myers, Geoffrey (2023). Preface. In Spectrum Auctions: Designing markets to benefit the public, industry and the economy (pp. ix - x). LSE Press. https://doi.org/10.31389/lsepress.spa.p picture_as_pdf
  • Myers, Geoffrey (2023). Promoting downstream competition. In Spectrum Auctions: Designing markets to benefit the public, industry and the economy (pp. 163 - 183). LSE Press. https://doi.org/10.31389/lsepress.spa.i picture_as_pdf
  • Myers, Geoffrey (2023). Regulation, public value, and policymaking. In Spectrum Auctions: Designing markets to benefit the public, industry and the economy (pp. 53 - 67). LSE Press. https://doi.org/10.31389/lsepress.spa.d picture_as_pdf
  • Myers, Geoffrey (2023). Spectrum auctions: designing markets to benefit the public, industry and the economy. LSE Press. https://doi.org/10.31389/lsepress.spa picture_as_pdf
  • Myers, Geoffrey (2023). Understanding the radio spectrum, auctions, and the UK case. In Spectrum Auctions: Designing markets to benefit the public, industry and the economy (pp. 13 - 33). LSE Press. https://doi.org/10.31389/lsepress.spa.b picture_as_pdf
    • O
  • Otsu, Taisuke, Pesendorfer, Martin, Takahashi, Yuya (2013). Testing for equilibrium multiplicity in dynamic Markov games. (Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 423). picture_as_pdf
  • Otsu, Taisuke, Pesendorfer, Martin, Takahashi, Yuya (2016). Pooling data across markets in dynamic Markov games. Quantitative Economics, 7(2), 523 - 559. https://doi.org/10.3982/QE612
    • P
  • Pagano, Marco, Röell, Ailsa (1991). Auction and dealership markets what is the difference? (Financial Markets Group Discussion Papers 125). Financial Markets Group, The London School of Economics and Political Science. picture_as_pdf
  • Palacios-Huerta, Ignacio, Parkes, David C., Steinberg, Richard (2024). Combinatorial auctions in practice. Journal of Economic Literature, 62(2), 517 - 553. https://doi.org/10.1257/jel.20221679 picture_as_pdf
    • S
  • Satterthwaite, Mark, Williams, Steven R., Zachariadis, Konstantinos (2012). Price discovery.
    • T
  • Tabaqchali, Ahmed (2024). A fistful of Dinars: demystifying Iraq’s dollar auction. (LSE Middle East Centre Paper Series 85). LSE Middle East Centre. picture_as_pdf