JEL classification

Journal of Economic Literature Classification (10696) D - Microeconomics (2307) D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty (632) D86 - Economics of Contract: Theory (45)
Number of items at this level: 45.
Article
  • Acs, Zoltan J., Braunerhjelm, Pontus, Karlsson, Charlie (2016). Philippe Aghion: recipient of the 2016 Global Award for Entrepreneurship Research. Small Business Economics, 48(1), 1-8. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11187-016-9801-2
  • Anderlini, Luca, Felli, Leonardo (1994). Incomplete written contracts: undescribable states of nature. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109(4), 1085-1124. https://doi.org/10.2307/2118357
  • Anderlini, Luca, Felli, Leonardo, Immordino, Giovanni (2019). Costly pretrial agreements. Journal of Legal Studies, 48(1), 159 - 188. https://doi.org/10.1086/699841
  • Anderson, Ronald W., Bustamante, Maria Cecilia, Guibaud, Stéphane, Zervos, Mihail (2018). Agency, firm growth, and managerial turnover. Journal of Finance, 73(1), 419 - 464. https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.12583
  • Azevedo, Eduardo M., Gottlieb, Daniel (2019). An example of non-existence of Riley equilibrium in markets with adverse selection. Games and Economic Behavior, 116, 152 - 157. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2019.04.007 picture_as_pdf
  • Ball, Ray, Li, Xi, Shivakumar, Lakshmanan (2015). Contractibility and transparency of financial statement information prepared under IFRS: evidence from debt contracts around IFRS adoption. Journal of Accounting Research, 53(5), 915 - 963. https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679X.12095
  • Brzustowski, Thomas, Georgiadis Harris, Alkis, Szentes, Balázs (2023). Smart contracts and the Coase conjecture. American Economic Review, 113(5), 1334 - 1359. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20220357 picture_as_pdf
  • Chaigneau, Pierre, Edmans, Alex, Gottlieb, Daniel (2018). Does improved information improve incentives? Journal of Financial Economics, 130(2), 291 - 307. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2018.05.002 picture_as_pdf
  • Chaigneau, Pierre, Edmans, Alex, Gottlieb, Daniel (2022). How should performance signals affect contracts? Review of Financial Studies, 35(1), 168 - 206. https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhab026 picture_as_pdf
  • Chaigneau, Pierre, Edmans, Alex, Gottlieb, Daniel (2025). A theory of fair CEO pay. American Economic Review: Insights, 7(3), 306 – 324. https://doi.org/10.1257/aeri.20240332 picture_as_pdf
  • Dessein, Wouter, Garicano, Luis, Gertner, Robert (2010). Organizing for synergies. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2(4), 77-114. https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.2.4.77
  • Eső, Péter, Szentes, Balázs (2017). Dynamic contracting: an irrelevance theorem. Theoretical Economics, 12(1), 109-139. https://doi.org/10.3982/TE2127
  • Felli, Leonardo, Harris, Christopher (2018). Firm-specific training. Journal of Economic Theory, 175, 585-623. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2018.01.010
  • Garrett, Daniel, Georgiadis, George, Smolin, Alex, Szentes, Balázs (2023). Optimal technology design. Journal of Economic Theory, 209, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2023.105621 picture_as_pdf
  • Ghatak, Maitreesh, Wahhaj, Zaki (2025). Motivational investments and financial incentives. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/ewaf008 picture_as_pdf
  • Gottlieb, Daniel, Moreira, Humberto (2022). Simple contracts with adverse selection and moral hazard. Theoretical Economics, 17(3), 1357 – 1401. https://doi.org/10.3982/TE2992 picture_as_pdf
  • Lach, Saul, Neeman, Zvika, Schankerman, Mark (2021). Government financing of R&D: a mechanism design approach. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 13(3), 238 - 272. https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20190053 picture_as_pdf
  • Liu, Xiaojie, Shen, Jim Huangnan, Deng, Kent (2022). Endowment structure, property rights and reforms of large state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in China: past, present and future. Structural Change and Economic Dynamics, 62, 675 - 692. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.strueco.2022.05.006
  • Macchiavello, Rocco, Morjaria, Ameet (2015). The value of relationships: evidence from a supply shock to Kenyan rose exports. American Economic Review, 105(9), 2911-2945. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20120141
  • Ozdenoren, Emre, Yuan, Kathy (2017). Contractual externalities and systemic risk. Review of Economic Studies, 84(4), 1789 - 1817. https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdw058
    • Working paper
  • Anderson, Ronald W., Bustamante, Maria Cecilia, Guibaud, Stéphane (2012). Agency, firm growth, and managerial turnover. (Financial Markets Group Discussion Papers 711). Financial Markets Group, The London School of Economics and Political Science. picture_as_pdf
  • Anderson, Ronald W., Bustamante, Maria Cecilia, Guibaud, Stéphane (2012). Agency, firm growth, and managerial turnover. London School of Economics and Political Science.
  • Bar-Isaac, Heski, Cuñat, Alejandro (2005). Long-term debt and hidden borrowing. (Financial Markets Group Discussion Papers 542). Financial Markets Group, The London School of Economics and Political Science.
  • Bienz, Carsten, Faure-Grimaud, Antoine, Fluck, Zsuzsanna (2011). Defeasance of control rights. (Financial Markets Group Discussion Papers 679). Financial Markets Group, The London School of Economics and Political Science. picture_as_pdf
  • Bienz, Carsten, Hirsch, Julia (2005). The dynamics of venture capital contracts. (Financial Markets Group Discussion Papers 552). Financial Markets Group, The London School of Economics and Political Science.
  • Bienz, Carsten, Walz, Uwe (2006). Evolution of decision and control rights in venture capital contracts: an empirical analysis. (Financial Markets Group Discussion Papers 585). Financial Markets Group, The London School of Economics and Political Science.
  • Bijapur, Mohan (2011). Moral hazard and renegotiation of multi-signal contracts. Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc..
  • Bruche, Max, Llobet, Gerard (2011). Walking wounded or living dead? Making banks foreclose bad loans. (Financial Markets Group Discussion Papers 675). Financial Markets Group, The London School of Economics and Political Science. picture_as_pdf
  • Buffa, Andrea, Vayanos, Dimitri, Woolley, Paul (2014). Asset management contracts and equilibrium prices. (Financial Markets Group Discussion Papers 736). Financial Markets Group, The London School of Economics and Political Science. picture_as_pdf
  • Burkart, Mike, Lee, Samuel (2012). Smart buyers. (Financial Markets Group Discussion Papers 696). Financial Markets Group, The London School of Economics and Political Science. picture_as_pdf
  • Chaigneau, Pierre (2010). Aversion to the variability of pay and optimal incentive contracts. (Financial Markets Group Discussion Papers 654). Financial Markets Group, The London School of Economics and Political Science. picture_as_pdf
  • Chaigneau, Pierre (2012). The effect of risk preferences on the valuation and incentives of compensation contracts. (Financial Markets Group Discussion Papers 697). Financial Markets Group, The London School of Economics and Political Science. picture_as_pdf
  • Chaigneau, Pierre, Edmans, Alex, Gottlieb, Daniel (2014). The value of informativeness for contracting. (Financial Markets Group Discussion Papers 737). Financial Markets Group, The London School of Economics and Political Science. picture_as_pdf
  • Chaigneau, Pierre, Sahuguet, Nicolas (2013). The effect of monitoring on CEO pay practices in a matching equilibrium. (Financial Markets Group Discussion Papers 725). Financial Markets Group, The London School of Economics and Political Science.
  • Cusumano, Carlo M., Gan, Tan, Pieroth, Ferdinand (2024). Misaligning incentives in teams. Social Science Research Network (SSRN). https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4533867
  • Dietrich, Diemo, Gehrig, Thomas (2021). Speculative and precautionary demand for liquidity in competitive banking markets. (Systemic Risk Centre Discussion Papers 110). Systemic Risk Centre, The London School of Economics and Political Science. picture_as_pdf
  • Edmans, Alex, Gabaix, Xavier, Jenter, Dirk (2017). Executive compensation: a survey of theory and evidence. (Financial Markets Group Discussion Papers 767). Financial Markets Group, The London School of Economics and Political Science. picture_as_pdf
  • Felli, Leonardo, Koenen, Johannes, Stahl, Konrad O (2011). Competition and trust: evidence from German car manufacturers. (CEPR discussion papers 8265). Centre for Economic Policy Research (Great Britain).
  • Fuchs, William, Garicano, Luis, Rayo, Luis (2014). Optimal contracting and the organization of knowledge. (CEP Discussion Papers CEPDP1308). London School of Economics and Political Science. Centre for Economic Performance.
  • Gan, Tan (2024). Robust advertisement pricing. Social Science Research Network (SSRN). https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4788687
  • Hatfield, John William, Padro i Miquel, Gerard (2006). Multitasking, limited liability and political agency. John William Hatfield and Gerard Padro i Miquel.
  • Liu, Xiaojie, Shen, Jim Huangnan, Deng, Kent (2016). A rational path towards a Pareto optimum for reforms of large state-owned enterprise in China, past, present and future. (Economic History Working Papers 244/2016). Department of Economic History, London School of Economics and Political Science.
  • Ozdenoren, Emre, Yuan, Kathy (2015). Endogenous contractual externalities. (Financial Markets Group Discussion Papers 746). Financial Markets Group, The London School of Economics and Political Science.
  • Ozdenoren, Emre, Yuan, Kathy (2012). Stock market tournaments. (Financial Markets Group Discussion Papers 706). Financial Markets Group, The London School of Economics and Political Science. picture_as_pdf
  • Shen, Huangnan, Fang, Lei, Deng, Kent (2017). Rise of ‘Red Zaibatsu’ in China: entrenchment and expansion of large state-owned enterprises, 1990-2016. (Economic History working papers 260/2017). Department of Economic History, London School of Economics and Political Science.