JEL classification

Journal of Economic Literature Classification (10696) M - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting (514) M5 - Personnel Economics (160) M52 - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects (stock options, fringe benefits, incentives, family support programs, seniority issues) (70)
Number of items at this level: 70.
None
  • Adams, Renee B., Ferreira, Daniel (2008). Do directors perform for pay? Journal of Accounting and Economics, 46(1), 154-171. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2008.06.002
  • Bandiera, Oriana, Barankay, Iwan, Rasul, Imran (2006). Incentives for managers and inequality among workers: evidence from a firm level experiment. Centre for Economic Policy Research (Great Britain).
  • Bandiera, Oriana, Barankay, Iwan, Rasul, Imran (2004). Relative and absolute incentives: evidence on worker productivity. Centre for Economic Policy Research (Great Britain).
  • Bandiera, Oriana, Barankay, Iwan, Rasul, Imran (2008). Social capital in the workplace: evidence on its formation and consequences. Labour Economics, 15(4), 724-748. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.labeco.2007.07.006
  • Bandiera, Oriana, Barankay, Iwan, Rasul, Imran (2010). Social incentives in the workplace. Review of Economic Studies, 77(2), 417-458. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-937X.2009.00574.x
  • Bandiera, Oriana, Barankay, Iwan, Rasul, Imran (2005). The evolution of cooperative norms: evidence from a natural field experiment. Centre for Economic Policy Research (Great Britain).
  • Beauregard, T. Alexandra (2014). Fairness perceptions of work−life balance initiatives: effects on counterproductive work behaviour. British Journal of Management, 25(4), 772-789. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8551.12052
  • Blanes i Vidal, Jordi, Nossol, Mareike (2009). Tournaments without prizes: evidence from personnel records. (CEP Labour Market Workshop). London School of Economics and Political Science. Centre for Economic Performance.
  • Bryson, Alex, Buraimo, Babatunde, Simmons, Rob (2011). Do salaries improve worker performance? Labour Economics, 18(4), 424-433. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.labeco.2010.12.005
  • Bryson, Alex, Böckerman, Petri, Ilmakunnas, Pekka (2011). Does high involvement management improve worker wellbeing? (NIESR discussion paper 380). National Institute of Economic and Social Research (NIESR).
  • Bryson, Alex, Böckerman, Petri, Ilmakunnas, Pekka (2011). Does high involvement management lead to higher pay? (NIESR discussion paper 376). National Institute of Economic and Social Research (NIESR).
  • Bryson, Alex, Clark, Andrew E., Freeman, Richard B, Green, Colin P. (2014). Share capitalism and worker wellbeing. (IZA discussion papers 8724). Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  • Bryson, Alex, Forth, John, Zhou, Minghai (2012). CEO bonding who posts performance bonds and why? (NIESR discussion papers 389). The National Institute of Economic and Social Research.
  • Bryson, Alex, Forth, John, Zhou, Minghai (2014). CEO incentive contracts in China: why does city location matter? In Ortega, Jaime (Ed.), International Perspectives on Participation (pp. 25-49). Emerald Group Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1108/S0885-333920140000015009
  • Bryson, Alex, Forth, John, Zhou, Minghai (2012). CEO incentive contracts in China: why does city location matter? (NIESR discussion paper 402). National Institute of Economic and Social Research.
  • Bryson, Alex, Forth, John, Zhou, Minghai (2012). The CEO labour market in China’s public listed companies. (NIESR discussion papers 391). The National Institute of Economic and Social Research.
  • Bryson, Alex, Forth, John, Zhou, Minghai (2014). How much influence does the Chinese state have over CEOs and their compensation? In Ortega, Jaime (Ed.), International Perspectives on Participation (pp. 1-23). Emerald Group Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1108/S0885-333920140000015001
  • Bryson, Alex, Forth, John, Zhou, Minghai (2012). What do we know about China's CEO's? Evidence from across the whole economy. (NIESR discussion papers 397). The National Institute of Economic and Social Research.
  • Bryson, Alex, Freeman, Richard (2014). Employee stock purchase plans: gift or incentive? Evidence from a multinational corporation. (NIESR Discussion Paper 439). National Institute of Economic and Social Research.
  • Bryson, Alex, Freeman, Richard B. (2014). Employee stock purchase plans: gift or incentive? Evidence from a multinational corporation. (IZA discussion papers 8537). Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  • Bryson, Alex, Simmons, Rob, Rossi, G. (2012). Why are migrants paid more? (NIESR discussion papers 388). The National Institute of Economic and Social Research.
  • Choudhary, M. Ali, Gabriel, Vasco J., Rickman, Neil (2021). Individual incentives and workers' contracts: evidence from a field experiment. Oxford Economic Papers, 73(1), 248 - 272. https://doi.org/10.1093/oep/gpz061
  • Felli, Leonardo, Villas-Boas, J. Miguel (2000). Renegotiation and collusion in organizations. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 9(4), 453-483. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2000.00453.x
  • Merchant, Kenneth A, Van der Stede, Wim A., Lin, Thomas W., Yu, Zengbiao (2011). Performance measurement and incentive compensation: an empirical analysis and comparison of Chinese and western firms' practices. European Accounting Review, 20(4), 639-667. https://doi.org/10.1080/09638180.2011.593293
    • Public
  • Ashraf, Nava, Bandiera, Oriana, Jack, Kelsy (2012). No margin, no mission?: a field experiment on incentives for pro-social tasks. (Discussion paper 8834). Centre for Economic Policy Research (Great Britain).
  • Ashraf, Nava, Bandiera, Oriana, Jack, B. Kelsey (2014). No margin, no mission? A field experiment on incentives for public service delivery. Journal of Public Economics, 120, 1-17. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2014.06.014
  • Ashraf, Nava, Bandiera, Oriana, Lee, Scott S. (2014). Awards unbundled: evidence from a natural field experiment. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 100, 44-63. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2014.01.001
  • Athanasakou, Vasiliki, Ferreira, Daniel, Goh, Lisa (2022). Changes in CEO stock option grants: a look at the numbers. Journal of Corporate Finance, 75, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2022.102226 picture_as_pdf
  • Axelson, Ulf, Bond, Philip (2011). Investment banking careers: an equilibrium theory of overpaid jobs. (Financial Markets Group Discussion Papers 690). Financial Markets Group, The London School of Economics and Political Science. picture_as_pdf
  • Axelson, Ulf, Bond, Philip (2015). Wall Street occupations. Journal of Finance, 70(5), 1949 - 1996. https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.12244
  • Azmat, Ghazala, Ferrer, Rosa (2015). Gender Gaps in Performance: Evidence from Young Lawyers. (CEP Discussion Papers CEPDP1136). London School of Economics and Political Science. Centre for Economic Performance. picture_as_pdf
  • Azmat, Ghazala, Iriberri, Nagore (2009). The importance of relative performance feedback information: evidence from a natural experiment using high school students. (CEP Discussion Paper 915). London School of Economics and Political Science. Centre for Economic Performance.
  • Azmat, Ghazala, Iriberri, Nagore (2012). The provision of relative performance feedback information: an experimental analysis of performance and happiness. (CEP Discussion Papers CEPDP1116). London School of Economics and Political Science. Centre for Economic Performance. picture_as_pdf
  • Bandiera, Oriana, Barankay, Iwan, Rasul, Imran (2013). Team incentives: evidence from a firm level. Journal of the European Economic Association, 11(5), 1079-1114. https://doi.org/10.1111/jeea.12028
  • Bayo-Moriones, Alberto, Galdon-Sanchez, Jose E., Guell, Maia (2004). Is seniority-based pay used as a motivation device? Evidence from plant level data. (CEPDP 646). London School of Economics and Political Science. Centre for Economic Performance.
  • Belfield, Richard, Benhamou, Salima, Marsden, David (2007). Incentive pay systems and the management of human resources in France and Great Britain. London School of Economics and Political Science. Centre for Economic Performance.
  • Belfield, Richard, Marsden, David (2005). Performance pay for teachers: linking individual and organisational level targets. London School of Economics and Political Science. Centre for Economic Performance.
  • Bloom, Nick, Kretschmer, Tobias, Van Reenen, John (2011). Are family-friendly workplace practices a valuable firm resource? Strategic Management Journal, 32(4), 343-367. https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.879
  • Bryson, Alex, Clark, Andrew E., Freeman, Richard B., Green, Colin P. (2015). Share capitalism and worker wellbeing. (CEP Discussion Papers CEPDP1329). London School of Economics and Political Science. Centre for Economic Performance.
  • Bryson, Alex, Forth, John, Zhou, Minghai (2012). CEO bonding who posts performance bonds and why? (CEP Discussion Papers CEPDP1135). London School of Economics and Political Science. Centre for Economic Performance. picture_as_pdf
  • Bryson, Alex, Forth, John, Zhou, Minghai (2013). CEO incentive contracts in China: why does city location matter? (CEPDP 1192). London School of Economics and Political Science.
  • Bryson, Alex, Freeman, Richard B. (2014). Employee stock purchase plans – gift or incentive? evidence from a multinational corporation. (CEP Discussion Papers CEPDP1307). London School of Economics and Political Science. Centre for Economic Performance.
  • Bryson, Alex, Zhou, Minghai (2012). What do we know about China's CEO's? Evidence from across the whole economy. (Centre for Economic Performance occasional papers 31). London School of Economics and Political Science. Centre for Economic Performance. picture_as_pdf
  • Bryson, Alex, Forth, John, Zhou, Minghai (2014). Who posts performance bonds and why?: evidence from China's CEOs. China Economic Review, 30, 520-529. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chieco.2014.03.001
  • Böckerman, Petri, Bryson, Alex, Ilmakunnas, Pekka (2011). Does high involvement management improve worker wellbeing? (CEP Discussion Papers CEPDP1095). London School of Economics and Political Science. Centre for Economic Performance. picture_as_pdf
  • Böckerman, Petri, Bryson, Alex, Ilmakunnas, Pekka (2011). Does high involvement management lead to higher pay? (CEP discussion paper 1046). London School of Economics and Political Science.
  • Chaigneau, Pierre (2010). Aversion to the variability of pay and optimal incentive contracts. (Financial Markets Group Discussion Papers 654). Financial Markets Group, The London School of Economics and Political Science. picture_as_pdf
  • Chaigneau, Pierre (2011). Explaining the structure of CEO incentive pay with decreasing relative risk aversion. (Financial Markets Group Discussion Papers 693). Financial Markets Group, The London School of Economics and Political Science. picture_as_pdf
  • Chaigneau, Pierre (2010). The optimal timing of executive compensation. (Financial Markets Group Discussion Papers 660). Financial Markets Group, The London School of Economics and Political Science. picture_as_pdf
  • Cordella, Antonio, Cordella, Tito (2017). Motivations, monitoring technologies, and pay for performance. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 133, 236-255. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2016.10.016
  • Cotofan, Maria (2021). Learning from praise: evidence from a field experiment with teachers. Journal of Public Economics, 204, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2021.104540 picture_as_pdf
  • Cuñat, Vicente, Guadalupe, Maria (2007). Executive compensation and competition in the banking and financial sectors. (Financial Markets Group Discussion Papers 598). Financial Markets Group, The London School of Economics and Political Science.
  • Cuñat, Vicente, Guadalupe, Maria (2004). Executive compensation and product market competition. (CEPDP 617). London School of Economics and Political Science. Centre for Economic Performance.
  • Cvitanić, Jakŝa, Xing, Hao (2018). Asset pricing under optimal contracts. Journal of Economic Theory, 173, 142-180. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2017.10.005
  • Edmans, Alex, Gosling, Tom, Jenter, Dirk (2021). CEO compensation: evidence from the field. (Financial Markets Group Discussion Papers 836). Financial Markets Group, The London School of Economics and Political Science. picture_as_pdf
  • Edmans, Alex, Gosling, Tom, Jenter, Dirk (2023). CEO compensation: evidence from the field. Journal of Financial Economics, 150(3). https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2023.103718 picture_as_pdf
  • Garbi, Elni, Genakos, Christos, Pagliero, Mario (2015). When pressure sinks performance: evidence from diving competitions. (CEP Discussion Papers CEPDP1345). London School of Economics and Political Science. Centre for Economic Performance.
  • Genakos, Christos, Pagliero, Mario (2009). Risk taking and performance in multistage tournaments: evidence from weightlifting competitions. (CEP Discussion Paper 928). London School of Economics and Political Science. Centre for Economic Performance.
  • Gomez, Rafael, Tzioumis, Konstantinos (2006). What do unions do to executive compensation? (CEPDP CEPDP0720). London School of Economics and Political Science. Centre for Economic Performance.
  • Gregg, Paul, Jewell, Sarah, Tonks, Ian (2010). Executive pay and performance in the UK. (Financial Markets Group Discussion Papers 657). Financial Markets Group, The London School of Economics and Political Science. picture_as_pdf
  • Livdan, Dmitry, Nezlobin, Alexander (2022). Incentivizing irreversible investment. Accounting Review, 97(2), 349 - 371. https://doi.org/10.2308/TAR-2017-0573 picture_as_pdf
  • Marsden, David (2015). Teachers and performance pay in 2014: first results of a survey. (CEP Discussion Papers CEPDP1332). London School of Economics and Political Science. Centre for Economic Performance.
  • Marsden, David (2009). The paradox of performance related pay systems: ‘why do we keep adopting them in the face of evidence that they fail to motivate?’. (CEP Discussion Papers 946). London School of Economics and Political Science. Centre for Economic Performance.
  • Marsden, David, Belfield, Richard (2009). Institutions and the management of human resources: incentive pay systems in France and Great Britain. (CEP Discussion Papers 941). Centre for Analysis of Social Exclusion.
  • Marsden, David, Belfield, Richard (2006). Pay for performance where output is hard to measure: the case of performance pay for school teachers. London School of Economics and Political Science. Centre for Economic Performance.
  • Martins, Pedro S., Ferreira, Joao R. (2025). Effects of individual incentive reforms in the public sector: the case of teachers. Public Choice, 204(3-4), 457 - 481. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-024-01256-z picture_as_pdf
  • Minni, Virginia Magda Luisa (2024). Global managers, local workers: wage setting inside a multinational firm. (CEP Discussion Papers CEPDP1975). London School of Economics and Political Science. Centre for Economic Performance. picture_as_pdf
  • Plantin, Guillaume, Tirole, Jean (2015). Marking to market versus taking to market. (Systemic Risk Centre Discussion Papers 51). Systemic Risk Centre, The London School of Economics and Political Science. picture_as_pdf
  • Schouwer, Thimo De, Gsottbauer, Elisabeth, Kesternich, Iris, Schumacher, Heiner (2025). Work meaning and fair wages. Labour Economics, 97, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.labeco.2025.102808 picture_as_pdf
  • Xu, Moqi (2014). Towards the end of any long-term incentive program for CEOs, the short term awaits – but it doesn’t need to be bad news.